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Abstract
We study the Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly in which two ﬁrms pro-
duce a homogeneous good under quadratic cost functions, and they seek to
maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and relative proﬁts. We show
that there exists a range of the equilibrium price in duopolistic equilibria.
This range of equilibrium price is narrower and lower than the range of the
equilibrium price in duopolistic equilibria under pure absolute proﬁt maxi-
mization, and the larger the weight on the relative proﬁt, the narrower and
lower the range of the equilibrium price. In this sense relative proﬁt maxi-
mization by the ﬁrms is more aggressive than absolute proﬁt maximization.
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1 Introduction
We study the Bertrand equilibrium in duopoly in which two ﬁrms produce a ho-
mogeneous good under quadratic cost functions, and they seek to maximize the
weighted sum of their absolute and relative proﬁts instead of their absolute proﬁts
themselves. The relative proﬁt of one ﬁrm is the diﬀerence between its absolute
proﬁt and the absolute proﬁt of the rival ﬁrm.
In recent years, maximizing relative proﬁt instead of absolute proﬁt has aroused
the interest of economists. For analyses of relative proﬁt maximization see Schaf-
fer (1989), Vega-Redondo (1997), Lundgren (1996), Kockesen et. al. (2000),
Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Lu
(2011). In another paper, Tanaka (2013), we have shown that under relative
proﬁt maximization the choice of strategic variables is irrelevant to the outcome in
duopoly. In that paper we considered a duopoly with diﬀerentiated goods. On the
other hand, in this paper we assume that the ﬁrms produce a homogeneous good
under quadratic cost functions, and set their prices.
We show the following results.
1. When the ﬁrms seek to maximize their pure absolute proﬁts, there exists
no monopolistic equilibrium, which is an equilibrium where only one ﬁrm
sells the good. And there exists a range of the equilibrium price in duopolis-
tic equilibria, which are equilibria where both ﬁrms set the same price. In
duopolistic equilibria the ﬁrms may earn positive absolute proﬁts.
2. When the ﬁrms seek to maximize the weighted sum of their absolute and rel-
ative proﬁts, also there exists no monopolistic equilibrium, and there exists
a range of the equilibrium price in duopolistic equilibria. This range of equi-
librium price is contained in the range of the equilibrium price in duopolis-
tic equilibria under pure absolute proﬁt maximization. But the range under
relative proﬁt maximization is narrower and lower than the range under ab-
solute proﬁt maximization, and the larger the weight on the relative proﬁt,
the narrower and lower the range of the equilibrium price. In this sense rela-
tive proﬁt maximization by the ﬁrms is more aggressive than absolute proﬁt
maximization. In duopolistic equilibria the ﬁrms may earn positive absolute
proﬁts.
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2 The model
There are two ﬁrms, A and B. They produce a homogeneous good. The price of
the good of Firm A is 𝑝𝐴 and the price of the good of Firm B is 𝑝𝐵. The outputs
of Firm A and B are denoted, respectively, by 𝑞𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵. The ﬁrms set the prices
of their goods, and consumers buy the good from the ﬁrm whose price is lower.
Let 𝑝 = min{𝑝𝐴, 𝑝𝐵}. Consumers' demand is represented by the following inverse
demand function.
𝑝 = 1 − 𝑞𝐴 − 𝑞𝐵.
If 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵, each ﬁrm acquires a half of the demand, and two ﬁrms constitute a
duopoly. Thus, if 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵,
𝑞𝐴 = 𝑞𝐵 =
1 − 𝑝
2 .
On the other hand if 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 (or 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝐴) Firm A (or Firm B) acquires total
demand, and it becomes a monopolist. Thus, if 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵,
𝑞𝐴 = 1 − 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑞𝐵 = 0.
If 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝐴,
𝑞𝐵 = 1 − 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑞𝐴 = 0.
The cost functions of Firm A and B are
𝑐𝐴(𝑞𝐴) = 𝑐𝑞2𝐴, and 𝑐𝐵(𝑞𝐵) = 𝑐𝑞2𝐵,
where 𝑐 > 0.
If 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵, the absolute proﬁt of Firm A is
𝜋𝑀𝐴 = (1 − 𝑝𝐴)𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝐴)2 = (1 − 𝑝𝐴)(𝑝𝐴 + 𝑐𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐).
𝑀 denotesmonopoly. Of course the proﬁt of Firm B is zero. Similarly if 𝑝𝐵 < 𝑝𝐴,
we have
𝜋𝑀𝐵 = (1 − 𝑝𝐵)𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐(1 − 𝑝𝐵)2 = (1 − 𝑝𝐵)(𝑝𝐵 + 𝑐𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐).
The proﬁt of Firm A is zero.
On the other hand, if 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵, the absolute proﬁts of Firm A and B are
𝜋𝐷𝐴 = 𝜋𝐷𝐵 =
1 − 𝑝
2 𝑝 − 𝑐 (
1 − 𝑝
2 )
2
= (
1 − 𝑝
4 ) (2𝑝 + 𝑐𝑝 − 𝑐)
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𝑝 is the common price, and 𝐷 denotes duopoly.
The objective of Firm A is the weighted sum of its absolute proﬁt and its rela-
tive proﬁt. In duopoly it is expressed as follows.
Π𝐷𝐴 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐷𝐴 + 𝛼(𝜋𝐷𝐴 − 𝜋𝐷𝐵 ) = 𝜋𝐷𝐴 − 𝛼𝜋𝐷𝐵 ,
and the objective of Firm B is
Π𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐷𝐵 + 𝛼(𝜋𝐷𝐵 − 𝜋𝐷𝐴 ) = 𝜋𝐷𝐵 − 𝛼𝜋𝐷𝐴 ,
where
0 < 𝛼 < 1.
Since, at a duopolistic equilibrium 𝜋𝐷𝐴 = 𝜋𝐷𝐵 , we have
Π𝐷𝐴 = Π𝐷𝐵 = (1 − 𝛼)𝜋𝐷𝐴 .
In monopoly the absolute proﬁt of a ﬁrm other than the monopolist is zero.
Thus, the absolute proﬁt and the relative proﬁt of the monopolist are equal, and the
objective of the monopolist is its absolute proﬁt, that is, if Firm A is a monopolist,
Π𝐴 = 𝜋𝑀𝐴 ,
and if Firm B is a monopolist,
Π𝐵 = 𝜋𝑀𝐵 .
Without loss of generality we assume 𝑝𝐴 ≤ 𝑝𝐵. Call a ﬁrm in duopoly a duopolist.
From these formulas we obtain the following results.
1. When 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐1+𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist is negative, when
𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐1+𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist is zero, and when 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵
and 𝑝𝐴 > 𝑐1+𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist is positive.
2. When 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐2+𝑐 the proﬁt of each duopolist is negative, when
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐2+𝑐 the proﬁt of each duopolist is zero, and when 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵
and 𝑝𝐴 > 𝑐2+𝑐 the proﬁt of each duopolist is positive.
3. When 𝑝𝐴 < 3𝑐2+3𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist which is the proﬁt of Firm A if
𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵, is smaller than the proﬁt of each duopolist which is the proﬁt of
each ﬁrm if 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵, when 𝑝𝐴 = 3𝑐2+3𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist is equal to
the proﬁt of each duopolist, and when 𝑝𝐴 > 3𝑐2+3𝑐 the proﬁt of the monopolist
is larger than the proﬁt of each duopolist.
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4. When 𝑝𝐴 < (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 we have
Π𝑀𝐴 < Π𝐷𝐴 ,
when 𝑝𝐴 = (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 we have
Π𝑀𝐴 = Π𝐷𝐴 ,
and when 𝑝𝐴 > (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 , we have
Π𝑀𝐴 > Π𝐷𝐴 .
We can show
𝑐
1 + 𝑐 <
(3 + 𝛼)𝑐
2(1 + 𝛼) + (3 + 𝛼)𝑐 <
3𝑐
2 + 3𝑐 .
Also we can show
when 𝛼 ⟶ 1, (3 + 𝛼)𝑐2(1 + 𝛼) + (3 + 𝛼)𝑐 ⟶
𝑐
1 + 𝑐 ,
and
when 𝛼 ⟶ 0. (3 + 𝛼)𝑐2(1 + 𝛼) + (3 + 𝛼)𝑐 ⟶
3𝑐
2 + 3𝑐 .
Let
̄𝑝 = (3 + 𝛼)𝑐2(1 + 𝛼) + (3 + 𝛼)𝑐 ,
and diﬀerentiating ̄𝑝 with respect to 𝛼,
𝑑 ̄𝑝
𝑑𝛼 = −
4𝑐
[2(1 + 𝛼) + (3 + 𝛼)𝑐]2 < 0.
Therefore, the larger the value of 𝛼 (the weight on the relative proﬁt), the lower
the value of ̄𝑝.
3 Absolute proﬁt maximization
In this section for reference we consider a case where each ﬁrm seeks to maximize
its absolute proﬁt. For details see Dastidar (1995).
First we show
Lemma 1.
There is no monopolistic equilibrium.
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Proof. Amonopolistic equilibrium is an equilibrium where Firm A is the monop-
olist. Suppose that 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 > 𝑐1+𝑐 . Then, Firm B can set 𝑝𝐵 slightly lower
than 𝑝𝐴 and earn the positive proﬁt. If 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐1+𝑐 , Firm A can set 𝑝𝐴
slightly higher than 𝑐1+𝑐 but lower than 𝑝𝐵 and earn the positive proﬁt, or Firm B
can set 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑝𝐴 and earn the positive proﬁt in duopoly. Of course 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐1+𝑐 is not
proﬁtable for Firm A. Q.E.D.
Next we show
Theorem 1.
There exists a range of the equilibrium price 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 3𝑐2+3𝑐 in duopolistic
equilibria.
Proof. A duopolistic equilibrium is an equilibrium where Firm A and B set the
same price.
1. Suppose 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 > 3𝑐2+3𝑐 . Then, Firm B (or A) can set 𝑝𝐵 (or 𝑝𝐴)
slightly lower then 𝑝𝐴 (or 𝑝𝐵), and increase its proﬁt as a monopolist.
2. Suppose 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝐴 ≤ 3𝑐2+3𝑐 . If Firm B (or A) sets 𝑝𝐵 (or 𝑝𝐴) lower
than 𝑝𝐴 (or 𝑝𝐵), it becomes a monopolist but its proﬁt decreases or does not
change.
3. Of course if 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐2+𝑐 , the proﬁts of the ﬁrms are negative, so
each ﬁrm can set its price higher than the price of the rival ﬁrm and make
its proﬁt zero.
Q.E.D.
4 Relative proﬁt maximization
In this section we consider a case where each ﬁrm seeks to maximize the weighted
sum of its absolute proﬁt and its relative proﬁt.
First we show
Lemma 2.
There is no monopolistic equilibrium.
Proof. Amonopolistic equilibrium is an equilibrium where Firm A is the monop-
olist. Suppose that 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 > 𝑐1+𝑐 . Then, Firm B can set 𝑝𝐵 slightly lower
than 𝑝𝐴, and earn the positive absolute proﬁt. If 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑐1+𝑐 , Firm A can
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set 𝑝𝐴 slightly higher than 𝑐1+𝑐 but lower than 𝑝𝐵 and earn the positive absolute and
relative proﬁts, or Firm B can set 𝑝𝐵 = 𝑝𝐴, and earn the positive absolute proﬁt in
duopoly with zero relative proﬁt. Of course 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐1+𝑐 is not proﬁtable for Firm A.
Q.E.D.
Next we show the existence of duopolistic equilibria.
Theorem 2.
There exists a range of the equilibrium price 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝≤ (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 in duopolis-
tic equilibria.
Proof. 1. Suppose 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 > (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 . The relative proﬁts of the
ﬁrms are zero. Firm B (or A) can set 𝑝𝐵 (or 𝑝𝐴) slightly lower then 𝑝𝐴 (or
𝑝𝐵), and earn the positive absolute proﬁt as a monopolist. Although that
proﬁt is smaller than its proﬁt in a duopolistic equilibrium when 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵
and (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 < 𝑝𝐴 < 3𝑐2+3𝑐 , its relative proﬁt is positive and its is equal to
its absolute proﬁt because the proﬁt of the rival ﬁrm is zero, and we have
Π𝑀𝐴 > Π𝐷𝐴 .
.
2. Suppose 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝐴 ≤ (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 . If Firm B (or A) sets 𝑝𝐵 (or
𝑝𝐴) lower than 𝑝𝐴 (or 𝑝𝐵), it becomes a monopolist, but is this case we have
Π𝐷𝐴 ≥ Π𝑀𝐴 .
Thus, there is no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
3. Of course if 𝑝𝐴 = 𝑝𝐵 and 𝑝𝐴 < 𝑐2+𝑐 , the absolute proﬁts of the ﬁrms are
negative and their relative proﬁts are zero, so each ﬁrm can set its price
higher than the price of the rival ﬁrm and make its absolute proﬁt zero and
its relative proﬁt positive since the absolute proﬁt of the rival ﬁrm is negative
because 𝑐2+𝑐 < 𝑐1+𝑐 .
Q.E.D.
Note that the range of the equilibrium price 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝≤ (3+𝛼)𝑐2(1+𝛼)+(3+𝛼)𝑐 in duopolistic
equilibria when the ﬁrms maximize the weighted sum of the absolute proﬁts and
the relative proﬁts is contained in the range of the equilibrium price 𝑐2+𝑐 ≤ 𝑝 ≤
3𝑐
2+3𝑐 in duopolistic equilibria under pure absolute proﬁt maximization. The former
is narrower and lower than the latter, and the larger the weight on the relative
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proﬁt, 𝛼, the narrower the range of the equilibrium price. Therefore, relative proﬁt
maximization by the ﬁrms is more aggressive than absolute proﬁt maximization.
Acknowledgement: We are very grateful to the reviewers for their helpful
comments on the original paper.
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